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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE. OF UTAH 
JOEL H. IZATT, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
,MARY C. IZATT, by and through 
her Guardian and Conservator, 
KENNETH G. CLARK, 
Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16882 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a divorce action wherein the plaintiff, respondent 
and cross-appellant (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff") sought 
a divorce from the defendant, appellant and cross-respondent (here-
inafter referred to as "defendant") who also sought a divorce by 
way of counterclaim. The parties sought a dissolution of their 
marriage and a distribution of the marital estate. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried without a jury to the Honorable Homer 
F. Wilkinson, District Judge of the Third Judicial District, on the 
Amended Complaint of the plaintiff and the Answer and Counterclaim 
of the defendant. Th~ Court heard testimony of the parties and 
various other witnesses and received memoranda and proposals for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the distribution of the marita.l estate on behalf of both parties. 
The Court entered a Decree of Divorce granting both parties a 
divorce as against the other, granted custody of the parties' four 
minor children to the plaintiff pursuant to a stipulation of the 
parties and provided for alimony of $1. 00 per year for the defendant 
By way of a Supplemental Decree of Divorce, the Court entered a 
distribution of property. This distribution also awarded to the 
defendant the net proceeds of the settlement of a malpractice case 
brought against several physicians and Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. This malpractice case arose out of personal injuries suffered 
by the defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant seeks to have the portion of the Decree of 
Divorce of the District Court which granted the plaintiff a divorce 
against the defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty reversed. 
The defendant further requests a modification of the property 
distribution so as to grant the defendant a lien on real property 
owned by the parties to the extent of 1/2 of the equity in the real 
property and to relieve the defendant from any payments ordered to 
be made to the parents of ~he plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Mary C. Izatt, is the mother of four 
chiidren and, P!ior to this action, was the wife of the plaintiff 
for 16 yeirs. (T zg6-297) The defendant suffers from organic 
brain damage and possible psychosis resulting from two cardiac 
-2-
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arrests suffered during surgery which the defendant underwent on 
May 3, 1973. (T 413- 414, 450) The defendant, without being informed 
of the nature or permancy of her admission, resided at the Plantation 
Convalescent Center from August 28, 1978, until following the time 
of trial. (T 297, 482-483, SOS) 
The plaintiff resides at 474 K Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, along with the four children of the marriage. (T 296-297) 
The plaintiff remarried sometime prior to the hearing held in this 
case on October 29, 1979. (T 270) 
The plaintiff testified that the parties' marriage, prior 
to the defendant's surgery, was "ideal". (T 301) The defendant 
had an ideal relationship with her children. (T 302) Following 
the surgery and the cardiac arrests, the defendant experienced some 
difficulty performing household chores on behalf of the family. (T 
441) 
The plaintiff's parents moved into the parties' home 
shortly after the time of the defendant's surgery. (T 399) They 
lived in the home for approximately 18 months and periodically 
thereafter during the next four or five years. These periodic 
stays would amount to approximately six months. 0 (T 400-401) 
The defendant required additional hospital care and was 
rehospitalized in January, 1974 at the University of Utah Hospital 
because of psychotic behavior (unusual, stressful behavior). (T 
305) Throughout the time since the defendant's surgery, she has 
been treated with. ·various med"ications. The:se medications have 
included Prolixin and Mellaril. (T 307, 415) 
-3-
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The plaintiff is employed by David W. Evans Advertising 
as a commercial artist. He earns $1, 7Q,Q per month before taxes and 
approximately $1,300 per month take home. CT 333) The Court 
ordered that alimony of $1.DO per ye~r be paid by the plaintiff to 
the defendant. (T 98, 156, 227) 
During the marriage, the parties accumulated assets of a 
significant value. The parties' home at 47 4 K Street, owned in the 
name of the plaintiff and the defendant is worth approximately 
$70, 000. (T 367) At the time of trial, the first mortgage on the 
home was approximately $16,000. (Exhibit 12-P; T 42) The net 
equity in the home is $ 54, 00 0. (T 333) The parties also have 
accumulated approximately $10,064 cash value from life insurance 
policies on the lives of the plaintiff and the defendant. (Exhibit 
12-P, Exhibit 6-P) The distribution of the case value of these 
insurance policies is not an issue on appeal. The parties also 
accumulated various assets individually or jointly, such as an 
automobile, household furnishings, savings and checking accounts, 
jewelry, clothing and personal effects, and employee benefit plans 
provided by the plaintiff's employer. The distribution of these 
assets is not an issue on appeal. 
A medical malpractice action arose out of the defendant's 
surgery. This action has been fully compromised and settled with 
the defendant receiving the net proceeds (after attorney's fees 
and costs) of $97,320.22. a 222, 228) The defendant was also 
granted a lieri in th~ amount of $13,500 in the parties' real propert 
-4-
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at 474 K Street. This lien is interest free and due and owing upon 
the sale of the property, upon the non-use of the property as a 
residence for th_e plaintiff and the children and upon the youngest 
' child reaching majority. (T 228) This lien in favor of the 
defendant is for approximatelj 25 percent of the net equity in the 
real property .. 
Mr. Wilford Izatt, the father of the plaintiff, testified 
that during the time when he and his wife lived in the Izatt home 
1: that they purchased all of the groceries used in the home. (T 401-
402) This testimony came from Mr. Izatt's memory and was without 
any documentation by way of receipts or other records. (T 403) 
t During the initial 18 month period, according to Wilford Izatt's 
* testimony, the cost of groceries would have been $200, sometimes 
, $250 per month. (T 401) During the other periodic visits, this 
1 cost was estimated to be approximately $50 to $75 per month. 
(T 403) The plaintiff's parents lived rent free in the parties' 
, home and consumed part of the food they purchased. (T 436) 
The plaintiff offered Exhibit 1-P which consisted of 15 
~ checks from Wilford L. or Wilda H. Izatt to Joel H. Izatt. This 
exhibit was received over the objection of the defendant. (T 309-
~ 314) The plaintiff testified that these checks were given to him 
•1 to pay bills which were incurred because of the defendant's medical 
Wl· 
expenses or on behalf of th~ defendant. ~ 312-313) The dates of 
!~) 
the checks begin on Decemoer 15, 1974 and continue periodically 
)Ii 
-5-
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un ti 1 'Apr i 1 16 , 19 7 g. • (Ex hi b it 1 - P) The p 1 a inti ff ' s father 
testified that the defendant did not receive the benefit of all 
of the money advanced. CT 43 8) 
On cross-ex·amination, the plaintiff admitted that checks 
dated November 6, 1978, December 7, 1978, December 22, 1978 and 
April 16, 1979, and totalling $3,275 were given to the plaintiff 
following the defendant's move to the Plantation Convalescent 
Center. (T 365) During this period of time, the defendant's 
expenses were beirig paid for by the L.D.S. Church. (T 323) The 
plaintiff further admitted that the plaintiff's parents had provided 
him financial assistance prior to the illness of the defendant. 
Checks dated August 2 (or 7), 1971 and January 1, 1971 were shown 
to the plaintiff ~ho admitted that they had been given to him prior 
to the def end ant's illness. (T 36 6) 
Check No. 4141 dated December 15, 1974 states that the 
check was a gift. Check No. 4303 dated December 24, 1974, states 
that it was for Xmas (sic). (Exhibit 1-P) 
The checks in Exhibit 1-P were deposited in account 
number 00513580 at Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company in Salt 
Lake City. (Exhibit 1-P) While these checks were asserted to have 
been given to the plaintiff in order to pay medical and other 
expenses of the defendant, the checks produced for defendant's 
counsel and admitte·d into evidence as Exhibit 13-D, written on the 
same account, indicate no payment of medical expenses or other 
expenses relating to the· defendant's illness. (Exhibit 13-D) 
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While the plaintiff testified that he had rec~rds to show these 
expenses, no such records were produced. CT 313) The plaintiff 
further agreed to determine how much of the medical expenses of the 
defendant were covered by insurance. (T 369) No such determination 
was ever presented. (T 39·6-397) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
A DIVORCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE 
DEFENDANT DID NOT TREAT THE PLAINTIFF IN A 
MENTALLY CRUEL MANNER. 
Utah Code Annotated 30-3-1 states that one of the grounds 
for a divorce is "cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant 
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental distress to 
the plaintiff." In Johnson vs. Johnson, 107 Utah 147, 152 P.Zd 426 
(1944) a divorce was granted, in part, because the defendant suffered 
from diabetes and liver trouble. This condition was alleged to 
have caused the plaintiff great mental distress, anguish and great 
mental suffering. The Court disallowed the granting of a divorce 
because of the illness. The Court stated: 
The 'condition' referred to above is 
defendant's physical condition, diabetes, 
and liver trouble, and the fact that 
such condition caused respondent distress 
is clearly no ground for divorce. 
152 P.Zd at 428. 
BTack'·s Law Dic.tio·n·ary ·-_1137 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), defines 
mental cruelty as follows: 
-7-
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A course of conduct on th~ part of 
one spouse toward the other spouse 
which can endanger the· mental and 
physical health and efficiency of 
the othei spouse to such an extent 
as to render continuance of the mari-
tal relation intolerable. 
Th~ evidence presented to the Court during the trial 
shows that the plaintiff and defendant had an "ideal" marriage 
prior to the defendant's surgery in May, 1973. The cardiac arrests 
suffered by the defendant resulted in organic brain damage, a 
physical condition, which required that the defendant receive 
additional care, assistance and medication. However, the defend~t 
did not embark upon a course of conduct designed to cause great 
mental or physical distress to the plaintiff. To the contrary, the 
defendant attempted to improve her ability to function both in the 
home and while institutionalized at the Plantation Convalescent 
Center. (T 321, 445-446, 485-486) The defendant, rather than 
acting in a way so as to cause harm to the plaintiff, continued to 
attempt to regain, to the extent possible, her prior abilities to 
deal with her husband, her family and others. These actions on 
behalf of the defendant do not entitle the plaintiff to a divorce 
on the grounds of mental cruelty. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR ANY ALLEGED DEBT TO THE PLAINTIFF'S 
PARENTS.· 
In the supplemental decree of the Court date·d January 15, 
1980, each party is required· to assume' and pay one-half of a 
-8-
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$10,205 liability to the plaintiff's parents. ~ 22S) The defendant 
should not be required to repay any of this amount because: (1) the 
liability, is supported at best by a moral obligation to repay 
which is not consideration for an olH~gation; (2) the obligation is 
a gift; (3) significant portions of the claim are not legally 
enforceable because they are barred by the statute of limitations 
and/or they are not obligations contemplated to be obligations 
imposed upon a party under the U_tah Necessity Statute (U.C.A. 
30-2-9); and/or, (4) the evidence is insufficient to establish the 
amount of the debt, the terms of payment or the defendant's 
responsibility for the debt. 
In Manwill vs. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.Zd 177 (1961), 
the plaintiff alleged he made payments on behalf of the defendants 
and transferred other valuable assets to the defendants. These 
claims were asserted to be enforceable because of the defendants' 
oral agreement to repay. The Court held that the action against 
the defendants could not be maintained since the obligation was 
based only upon a moral obligation to repay. The Court stated: 
The position the plaintiff essays is that 
the earlier payments he claims to have made 
for the defendants' benefit placed them under 
moral obligation to repay him, and that this 
constitute~ valid consideration to make their 
1957 oral promise a binding contract. The 
rule quite generally recogni~ed is that a 
moral obligation by itself will not do so. 
Although some authorities appear to be other-
wise,- it will usually be found that there are 
special circumstances bolsteii~g what is termed 
the moral o51igation. 
-9-
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The difficulty we see with ·the doctrine is 
that if a mere moral, as distinguished from 
a leg.al, obligation were. recognized as valid 
con~ideratiori for a contract~ that would 
practically erode to the vanishing point the 
necessity for finding a consideration. This 
is so, first ·becaus~ in nearly all circumstances 
where a promise is made theie is some moral 
aspect of the situation which provides the 
motivation for making the promise even if it 
is to make an outright gift. And second, if 
we are <lealing with moral concepts, the making 
of a promise· itself creates a moral obligation 
to peiform it. It seems obVious that if a 
contract to b~ legally enforceable need be 
anything other than a naked promise, something 
more than mere moral consideration is necessary. 
The principle that in order for a contract 
to be valid and binding, each party must be 
bound to give some legal consideration to 
the other by conferring a benefit upon 
him or suffering a legal detriment at his 
request is firmly implanted in the roots 
of our law. 
In urging that the moral consideration 
here present makes a binding contract, 
plaintiff places reliance on what is termed 
the 'material benefit rule' as reflecting 
the trend of modern authority. The sub-
stance of that rule is that where the 
promisers have received something from 
the promisee of value in the form of 
money or other material benefits under 
such circumstances as to create a moral 
obligation to pay for what they received, 
and later promise to do so there is con-
sideration for such promise. But even 
the authorities standing for that rule 
affirm that. there must be something beyond 
a bare promise, as of an offered gift or 
gratuity. The circumstances must be 
suc_h that it is reasonably to be supposed 
~hat the promise_e expected to b.e compensated 
in some way therefor. (Designation of 
promisee and promiser as pl~intiff or 
defendant omitted.) Citations omitted) 
361 P.Zd at 178-17S 
-10-
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This alleged debt to the plaintiff's pa.rents is based 
solely upon a moral obligation to repay. The plaintiff's father, 
Wilford Izatt, testified that he advanced money to the plaintiff 
and performed painting and other servcies for the plaintiff with 
the plaintiff only being obligated to repay if he were able. Mr. 
Izatt further testified that he advanced the money or performed the 
services for his son because he was a father and not because he 
expected repayment. (T 433) Even the plaintiff's promise to repay 
if he were able, is not sufficient to create a contractual obli-
gation under Utah law. According to Manwill, it is required that 
the promisee (Mr. Wilford Izatt) expected to be compensated in some 
way. 
The plaintiff's father testified that he fully intended 
to assist the plaintiff because of the father-son relationship. (T 
433) The agreement to repay the advances never had a specific due 
date. (T 405) The times for and substance of the discussions re-
garding repayment could only be testified to as to memory. In 
discussions regarding the painting of the house, no amount as to 
the amount to be paid was ever determined nor was a time for re-
payment established. (T 407) The indefinite nature of this 
testimony points out the actual substance of the agreement between 
the plaintiff and the plaintiff's father, i.e. the plaintiff's 
father intended to and did make gifts to the plaintiff at various 
times. 
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These advances of money were not related to expenses 
incident to the defendant's illne·ss. Had this been the case, no 
such payments would have been required such as those received in 
1971 and those in 1979. Further, these obligations were not relati 
to the defendant's illnes·s· since during much of the time after the 
original lS months when the plaintiff's parents were living int~ 
family home, the medical and nursing care for the defendant was 
being paid for by the L.n.s·. Church or by insurance. 
Irt M~~e vs. "Tirtgey, 106 Utah 420, 149 P.2d 832 (1944), 
the plaintiff desired to reco~er a debt allegedly owed by defendut 
to the plaintiff as executor of the estate of a decedent. The 
defendant claimed that the decedent had made a gift of the amount 
in question. The Court explained the factors to be considered in 
determining whether a transaction is a gift or a loan as follows: 
... Where, as here, the question is as to 
whether the transaction was a loan or a 
gift, and neither party can testify thereto, 
the circumstances under which the transaction 
took place are certainly material in determin-
ing the intent of the donor and the ourpose 
for which the property was turned ov~r ... 
Th~ relation of the parties, the situation 
then existing, and the circumstances under 
which the gift was made, including the donor's 
previous life, habits and relations to others, 
as well as the condition of the donor at the 
time of the gift may be considered by the 
court; so. too evidence of friendly or affection-
ate ~elations h~t~~en the parties; that the 
partres had resided together; and that the 
donee had rendered service to the donor is 
admissible ·on the question uf motive and 
interit. 149 P.2d at 833-834. 
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In the present case, the testimony showed that the 
plaintiff's parents advanced money to the plaintiff before, during 
and after the time of the defendant's illness and residence with 
the family. The advances were made out of the plaintiff's 
father's belief that he had an obligation to h~lp his son. This 
relationship had existed from th~ time the plaintiff was a boy. 
The plaintiff's father would also have helped his other children 
in similar ways. These facts show that the advances made by the 
plaintiff's father were intended to be gifts. The persons making 
the advances were not even asserting the claims on their own 
behalf. 
The plaintiff's parents are not parties to this action. 
Therefore, no award should have been made to them as a part of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce. At best, the decree should only 
have made the parties liable for one-half of any claim to be 
asserted by the plaintiff's parents. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiff can assert a 
liability on behalf of his parents, this claim is unenforceable. 
In large part, the claim is unenforceable because it is barred by 
the statute of limitations. Further, the claim does not come 
within the requirements of the Utah Necessity Statute. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26 requires that an 
action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, 
except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed 
., '1' 
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by the statutes of this state be brought within three years. This 
three year statute of limitations applies to actions brought under 
the Utah Necessity Statute (Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-·9). 
Walker B'r·othe·r's 'Drygo·ods Co., vs·. Whitha11, 61 Utah 259, 212 Pac. 
523 (1923). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-25(1) states that "an 
action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon u 
instrument in writing; . . . " shall be brought within four years. 
No action has actually been filed by the parents in order to 
determine the timeliness of the assertion of the claim. Assuming, 
arguendo, that the filing of the divorce complaint on December 8, 
1978 began the action for recovery, any advances of money or 
performance of servcies prior to December 8, 1975, would be barred 
by the three year statute of limitations applicable to actions 
under the Utah Necessity Statute. The liability on the basis of an 
oral contract would be barred for any claims arising prior to 
December 8, 1974. 
The plaintiff, during argument in this matter, argued 
that the statute of limitations could not be raised as an issue 
because Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes a 
statute of limitations defense an affirmative defense which must be 
specifically ple~ded. This argument is fallacious because the 
collection of the all~ged· debt by the plaintiff's parents is not 
the nature of this action. Th~ cliim for th~ parents is made by 
way of a liability asserted By th~ plaintiff in establishing the 
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size and nature of the marital estate. Therefore, the statute of 
limitations is not an affirmative defense to the allegations in 
the divorce complaint but rather is a matter of substantive law 
which can be asserted to challenge the sufficiency of a liability 
claim. 
From the checks in Exhibit P-1, only $4,870 of these 
amounts were advanced· following December 8, 197 5, the date for the 
running of the statute of limitations for claims under the necessity 
statute. The amount of the liability is further limited by the 
fact that the family only lived together until August 28, 1978. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-2-9 states: 
The expenses of the family and the education 
of the children are chargeable upon the 
property of both husband and wife or of either 
of them, and in relation thereto, they may be 
sued jointly or separately. 
In Berow vs·. Shields, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538 (1916), 
the plaintiff merchant extended credit to the defendant wife for 
certain purchases of clothing. The trial court held the defendant 
husband not liable for the debts incurred by the wife for the goods 
and merchandise supplied to the defendant wife following. the term-
ination of the family relationship. The court stated two pre-
requisites for recovery under the necessity statute, namely (1) the 
relation of husband and wife must exist and (_2) the expenses for 
which either or both spouses· are liable must be "family expenses". 
As to whether a family relationship existed, the court 
cited with approval Gilman· Vs. Matthe'ws, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 Pac. 
366 (1904) as follows: 
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In an action against a wife for wearing 
apparel purchased and worn by the husband, 
it is not sufficient to sho"w that they are 
husband and wife, but it must also be shown 
th~t they are living together, so as to 
constitute a family. 48 Utah at 275. 
As of August 28, 1978, the plaintiff intentionally and 
permanently placed the defendant in the Plantation Convalescent 
Center. ·This severed the family relationship between the plaintiff 
and defendant so as to disallow any claims against the defendant 
for "family expenses" incurred after this date. The amount of the 
money advanced to Joel Izatt following December 8, 1975 and before 
August 28, 1978 is $1,595. 
The purpose of the necessity statute as set forth in 
Berow vs. Shields, ·su·p·ra. at 277, is to protect merchants and 
traders as well as husband and wife. A merchant or trader is not 
in a position to know of the financial or marital status of those 
with whom he deals. Consequently, protection for these persons 
providing necessities is proper and is provided by the statute. 
The plaintiff's parents are not merchants or traders and were fully I 
able to protect themselves against any potential losses for advances 
made to th~ plaintiff had such been their intention. They were in 
a position to determine the financial position of the plaintiff and 
the need for the money, but chose to rely upon the plaintiff's 
representations. Consequently, the necessity statute does not 
validate claims such as the one made D.y the plaintiff. 
The ·testimony of the· plaintiff and the plaintiff's father 
indicates th~t th~y enjoyed a close father-son relationship. 
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However, the testimony does not substantiate the amount of the 
debts, the terms of the payment or the binding nature of the 
obligation. For example, upon direct examination by Mr. Madsen as 
to the amount agre~d upon to be paid for the painting, the plaintiff's 
father testified that a mee.tin.g took place which involved the 
plaintiff, the defendant, the plaintiff's mother and the plaintiff's 
father. The painting was discussed at this meeti~g, but no price 
for the painting was set. The testimony continued and it was 
stated that at another time a value of $1,500 was set. While the 
plaintiff did establish some foundation for the testimony regarding 
the original meeting involving the plaintiff, defendant, plaintiff's 
mother and plaintiff's father, no foundation was established as to 
the meeting when the agreement as to the $1,500 was established. 
Consequently, this testimony should not have been received. (T 
407-410) 
On cross-examination, the plaintiff's father testified 
that he would help the plaintiff without regard to the plaintiff's 
ability to repay the debt. While the plaintiff's father testified 
that he discussed the necessity of the requests made by the plaintiff, 
he did not, at any time, know or inquire abut the income of the 
plaintiff. The plantiff's father testified that if he ~he plain-
tiff) had been able to do it himself he would not have asked me 
(the plaintiff's father}. (_T 433-435) This testimony is contradictory 
-
to the plaintiff's father's testimony on direct examination where 
he stated that they would· talk about the request to determine if 
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they were really necessary. Further, there is no indication, 
except for the plaintiff's testimony that the amounts were expended 
for medical care or oth~r costs relating to the defendant's ill-
ness. This evidence doei not· meet with the test of B~~ow which 
clearly requires that it be shown that the expenses be for "family 
expenses". 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO A 
LIEN FOR ONE-HALF OF THE EQUITY IN THE 
PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFNDANT'S '"REAL PROPERTY. 
The Court awarded the defendant a lien of $13,500 in the 
real property owned by the parties. This lien is for twenty-five 
percent of the estimated equity of the parties in the real proper~. 
The lien is without interest and is payable only upon (1) the 
resale of the home; (2) the plaintiff no longer using the home as a 
residence for himself and the family; and (3) the youngest child 
reaching majority. Originally, the Court ordered a fourth limita-, 1 
tion which required payment of the lien upon the plaintiff's remarri 
The defendant stipulated to allow this restriction to be removed 
because the plaintiff had already remarried. The defendant did so 
because of the defendant's desire to assist in the raising of her 
children and to allow them to grow up in the home they were alrea~ 
living in. However, the defendant did not stipulate to any reductioi 
of the or.igina1 lien which was established for one-half of the 
equity in the real property. 
By allowi~g the· plaintiff tO' retain posse·ssion of the 
real property, the de·fendant has contributed to the plaintiff 
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and the family, in effect, a term for years for approximately 
twelve years until th~ time the last child reaches majority. The 
defendant is foregoing any return on investment on her interest in 
the real property during this period of time; will not be com-
pensated for any loss in purchasing power which results because of 
inflation or otherwise during this period of time; will not share 
in any future increases in the value of the real property; and is 
providing a place to li~e for the plaintiff, the plaintiff's new 
wife and the children of the plaintiff and the defendant. This 
means that the defendant has bestowed a substantial ecomonic 
benefit on the plaintiff and the family and should be entitled to 
a lien equivalent to at least one-half of the equity in the real 
property. 
The major portion of the marital assets consisted 
of the real property. The distribution of the other marital assets 
and liabilities (except the debt to the plaintiff's parents) are 
not issues on appeal. 
The trial court, in Supplemental Findings of Fact 19 
stated: "The Court finds that the plaintiff has sustained trauma 
and medical problems resulting from the defendant·' s injuries and 
condition as a result thereof; the Court has taken this into 
consideration, together with the responsibility and the expense 
which plaintiff will have in raising the minor children in deter-
mining what is fair and equitaole between the parties." (T 223) 
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As stated in Jo·hn·s·o'n vs·.· ·Johns·on, supra. , a party's injuries and 
condition do not substantiate the right of another party to a 
divorce on th.e grounds of mental cruelty. Likewise, the 
injuries and physical condition of a party do not entitle another 
party to compensation. In short, a divorce action is not a person8 
injury action. 
It is unfair and inequitable for the defendant to 
receive a lien for only one-fourth of the equity in the real 
property in light of the contributions and sacrifices made by the 
defendant. The ·defendant is no longer able to live in her home; 
she is separated from her children; the plaintiff and his new 
wife are making use of the property without compensation to the 
defendant; she is directly subsidizing the housing costs of the 
plaintiff, his new wife and the children for the next twelve years; 
and she is not receiving any support from the plaintiff (except 
for alimony of $1.00 per year). The defendant served faithfully 
and well for 16 years as the plaintiff's wife and the mother of 
their four children. 
CONCLUION 
The circumstances which the parties have faced since 
May, 1973, have been unfortunate. Following an "ideal" marriage, 
the defendant has been separated permanently from her husband and 
her children. It is unlikely that she will remarry. The tragedy 
of the situation sfro"uld ae· minimized D..y correctly applying the 
law as follows: 
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The plaintiff should not be. granted a divorce against 
the defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty. Suffering from a 
physical injury or condition does not constitute mental cruelty. 
The 'liability to the plaintiff's parents should not be 
allowed because: (1) the liability is supported only by moral 
consideration; (2) the advances· made were gifts; (3) the liability 
is legally unenforceable under the riecessity statute and/or the 
statute of limitations, and/or (4) the evidence is insufficient to 
establish the claim. The plaintiff's parents are not parties to 
this action nor does the Court have any jurisdiction over them. 
Consequently, no award by way of the Supplemental Decree should 
have been made to them. At most, the plaintiff and defendant 
should be made liable for one-half of the claim of the plaintiff's 
parents. The plaintiff's parents would then be in the proper 
position of being required to assert their claim on their own 
behalf. 
During the parties' marriage, they accumulated a moderate 
marital estate consisting primarily of the equity in their real 
property. The amount of this equity is approximately $54,000. The 
defendant, being the wife of the plaintiff of 16 years and the 
mother of the parties' four children, is equitably entitled to more 
than a $13,500, no interest lien in the real property when the 
plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property for himself, 
his new wife, and the· children. 
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The defendant respectfully submits that the District 
Court's grant of a divorce to the plaintiff against the defendant 
should be reversed, that the defendant should not be responsible 
for any obligation to the plainti£f's parents and that the 
defendant sh6uld be entitled to a lieri for one-half of the equity 
in the parties' real property. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this [)*=_A. day of May, 1980. 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
, .. 
"'-· ... :-..· i 
'REX Jy 
TIMOTHY R. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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